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UNDERSCORING PAULO FREIRE'S FREEDOM AS ESSENCE OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE IN KENYA

Abstract

In its endeavor to make education relevant to the needs of the Kenyan people, educational reforms could perhaps underscore Paulo Freire's concept of banking education. Freire articulates the banking concept of education as a hindrance to the realization of the essence of education as practice of freedom. In the banking model education climate, students are often treated as receptacles for the knowledge that comes from the instructor, and are therefore not given a free orientation to their own ideas. This articulation of education stifles critical thinking, because students are taught to disassociate their educational improvement from their experience. The banking approach puts education in crisis because critical thinking or first order thinking that is fundamental to human experience fails to cultivate its importance to the skills and information demonstrated in a classroom.

Key Words: *Education; Teachers; Pedagogy; Oppression; Learners; Curriculum*

1.INTRODUCTION

The principle underlying education reforms in Kenya seems to be the equipment of learners with relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes for service, not only to the society but also for personal fulfillment. Checked against various stages of educational practices and reforms, there is evidence of gaps between expectations and results in Kenya. The 7-4-2-3-System of Education that was geared towards manpower development did not obtain. It was observed that the system lacked the capacity and flexibility to respond to the changing aspirations of individual Kenyans and the labour market needs, in terms of new skills, new technologies and the attitude to work Owino (1997). The 8-4-4 System of Education which arose out of the concerns that a basic academic education might lack the necessary content to promote widespread sustainable (self) employment hence championed the philosophy of education for Self-reliance has been criticize for not living to this expectation (Desouza; 1987).

The Government of Kenya in its report of the Task Force set up in January indicates that at the present, the quality of education in Kenya is not clearly spelt out so that the curriculum delivery could focus on development of specific expected competences to be assessed. A recommendation for a more flexible and comprehensive structure for Kenya's education system and curriculum reform to specify the expected competences at every

level of learning has been put forward. The rationale for the revised structure is to ensure learners acquire competences and skills that will enable them to meet the human resource aspirations by offering a choice of subject pathways at the end of the Elementary School phase; ensure the attainment of 100% transition rate from primary to secondary, thereby reducing wastage by introducing automatic progression to the junior secondary phase based on the acquisition of core skills and competences (literacy, numeracy and communication skills). The revised structure will also focus on early identification and nurturing of talent in individual learners at the end of the junior secondary phase; allow for specialization at the end of junior secondary; introduce a system of Competence Assessment Tests (CATS) measuring knowledge, skills and competences, the results of which will be cumulative and form part of a formative assessment process, the credits from which will be accumulated in the summative assessment at the end of each phase. This is distinct from the present situation where students either pass or fail and exit the system.

One area of educational practice that has not been addressed for review, from the onset formal education in Kenya is the classroom interaction between the learner and the teacher. This interaction described as pedagogy in this proposed study is a pivot point (joint) between the content of education and the outcome. Whereas pedagogy has received no attention, from the foregoing historical

overview of educational aspiration in Kenya, it seems that education is evaluated on the strength of learning outcome as evident from the central role of examinations at each terminal level of schooling and the ability to find employment. As Emmick (2007) discusses education today is governed by an outcome-based paradigm. Teachers and students alike are evaluated and determined by their scores on standardized tests, which articulate how the assessment of skills and information have overwhelmingly become the sole basis for an educated person. Students are treated like receptacles for knowledge that they only find outside of themselves, in the teacher or class material. They are not given a free orientation towards the development of their own learning if their educative environment already requires that regurgitating answers is the only worthwhile educative measure. Likewise, teachers are expected to put skills and information inside of students without granting them access towards their own pedagogical or curricular prejudices, something that may become the most important "outcome" of a healthy education.

In an outcome based learning environment, both students and teachers alike tend to develop an inability to investigate the presuppositions involved in their own learning. They will not be capable of the kind of first order thinking fundamental to human growth and flourishing, because they have fixed their gaze towards learning with an unhealthy orientation towards improper goals and standards (Emmick; 2007). The un-educated are those who have

not been given a free orientation towards their own self-development by being forced into an education that accepts only pre-authorizes answers or certain and determinate outcomes. However, if we really want to reform this paradigm, then our inquiry might be well served by a critique of this technical prejudice which itself does not fall prey to a technical interpretive mode.

2.THEORETICAL SUPPORT

Paulo Freire (2005) theorizes that through their continuing praxis, men and women simultaneously create history and become historical-social beings. Because — in contrast to animals, people can tri-dimensionalize time into the past, the present, and the future, their history, in function of their own creations, develops as a constant process of transformation within which epochal units materialize. These epochal units are not closed periods of time, static compartments within which people are confined. Were this the case, a fundamental condition of history, its continuity, would disappear. On the contrary, epochal units interrelate in the dynamics of historical continuity.

An epoch is characterized by a complex of ideas, concepts, hopes, doubts, values, and challenges in dialectical interaction with their opposites, striving towards plenitude. The concrete representations of many of these ideas, values, concepts, and hopes, as well as the

obstacles which impede the people's full humanization, constitute the themes of that epoch. These themes imply others which are opposing or even antithetical; they also indicate tasks to be carried out and fulfilled. Thus, historical themes are never isolated, independent, disconnected, or static; they are always interacting dialectically with their opposites. Nor can these themes be found anywhere except in the human-world relationship. The complex of interacting themes of an epoch constitutes its "thematic universe."

Confronted by this "universe of themes" in dialectical contradiction, persons take equally contradictory positions: some work to maintain the structures, others to change them. As antagonism deepens between themes which are the expression of reality, there is a tendency for the themes and for reality itself to be mythicized, establishing a climate of irrationality and sectarianism. This climate threatens to drain the themes of their deeper significance and to deprive them of their characteristically dynamic aspect. In such a situation, myth-creating irrationality itself becomes a fundamental theme. Its opposing theme, the critical and dynamic view of the world, strives to unveil reality, unmask its myth-cization, and achieve a full realization of the human task: the permanent transformation of reality in favor of the liberation of people.

In the last analysis, the *themes* both contain and are contained in *limit-situations;* the *tasks* they imply require *limit-acts.* When the themes are concealed by the limit-situations and thus are not

clearly perceived, the corresponding tasks, people's responses in the form of historical action, can be neither authentically nor critically fulfilled. In this situation, humans are unable to transcend the limit, situations to discover that beyond these situations and in contradiction to them lies an *untested feasibility.* In sum, limit-situations imply the existence of persons who are directly or indirectly served by these situations, and of those who are negated and curbed by them. Once the latter come to perceive these situations as the frontier between being and being more human, rather than the frontier between being and nothingness, they begin to direct their increasingly critical actions towards achieving the untested feasibility implicit in that perception. On the other hand, those who are served by the present limit situation regard the untested feasibility as a threatening limit-situation which must not be allowed to materialize, and act to maintain the status quo. Consequently, liberating actions upon an historical milieu must correspond not only to the generative themes but to the way in which these themes are perceived.

3.PAULO FREIRE ON FREEDOM AS THE ESSENCE OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

As we attempt to *analyze* dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: *the word.* But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and

action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed, even in part the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.

An unauthentic word, one which is unable to transform reality, results when dichotomy is imposed upon its constitutive elements. When a word is deprived of its dimension of action, reflection automatically suffers as well; and the word is changed into idle chatter, into *verbalism,* into an alienated and alienating "blah." It becomes an empty word, one which cannot denounce the world, for denunciation is impossible without a commitment to transform, and there is no transformation without action. On the other hand, if action is emphasized exclusively to the detriment of reflection, the word is converted into *activism*. The latter, action for action's sake negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible. Either dichotomy, by creating unauthentic forms of existence, creates also unauthentic forms of thought which reinforce the original dichotomy.

Human existence cannot be silent nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world. To exist humanly is to *name* the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the names as a problem and requires of them a new *naming*. Human beings are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection. But while to say the true word which is work, which is praxis is to

transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few persons, but the right of everyone. Consequently no one can say a true word alone nor can she say it *for* another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words.

Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming — between those who deny others the right to speak their word and those who are right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression.

If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it dialogue imposes itself as the way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person's "depositing" ideas in another; nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be "consumed" by the discussants. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among

women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind.

4.THE TENETS OF DIALOGICS

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause, the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it loves, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the

world if I do not love life if I do not love people I cannot enter into dialogue.

On the other hand, dialogue cannot exist without humility. The naming of the world, through which people constantly re-create that world, cannot be an act of arrogance. Dialogue, as the encounter of those addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from others mere "its" in whom I cannot recognize other "I"s? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of pure men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are "these people" or "the great unwashed"? How can I dialogue if I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I dialogue if I am closed to and even offended by the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness? Self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world. Someone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only

people who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know.

Dialogue further requires an intense faith in humankind, faith in their power to make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in their vocation to be more fully human (which is not the privilege of an elite, but the birthright of all). Faith in people is an *a priori* requirement for dialogue; the "dialogical man" believes in others even before he meets them face to face. His faith, however, is not naive. The "dialogical man" is critical and knows that although it is within the power of humans to create and transform, in a concrete situation of alienation individuals may be impaired in the use of that power. Far from destroying his faith in the people, however, this possibility strikes him as a challenge to which he must respond. He is convinced that the power to create and transform, even when thwarted in concrete situations, tends to be reborn. And that rebirth can occur not gratuitously, but in and through the struggle for liberation in the supersedence of slave labor by emancipated labor which gives zest to life. Without this faith in people, dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation.

Founding itself upon love, humility, and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence. It would be a contradiction in terms if dialogue loving, humble, and full of faith did not produce this climate of mutual trust, which leads the dialoguers

into ever closer partnership in the naming of the world. Conversely, such trust is obviously absent in the anti-dialogic of the banking method of education. Whereas faith in humankind is an *a priori* requirement for dialogue, trust is established by dialogue. Should it founder, it will be seen that the preconditions were lacking. False love, false humility, and feeble faith in others cannot create trust. Trust is contingent on the evidence which one party provides the others of his true, concrete intentions; it cannot exist if that party's words do not coincide with their actions. To say one thing and do another to take one's own word lightly cannot inspire trust. To glorify democracy and to silence the people is a farce; to discourse on humanism and to negate people is a lie.

Nor yet can dialogue exist without hope. Hope is rooted in men's incompletion, from which they move out in constant search a search which can be carried out only in communion with others. Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanization resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by injustice. Hope, however, does not consist in crossing one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope; and if I fight with hope, then I can wait. As the encounter of women and men seeking to be more fully human, dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopelessness. If the dialoguers expect nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious.

Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them, thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity, thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved. Critical thinking contrasts with naive thinking, which sees "historical time as a weight, a stratification of the acquisitions and experiences of the past," from which the present should emerge normalized and "well-behaved." For the naive thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalized "today." For the critic, the important thing is the continuing transformation of reality, in behalf of the continuing humanization of men. For naïve thinking, the goal is precisely to hold fast to this guaranteed space and adjust to it. By thus denying temporality, it denies itself as well.

Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. Education which is able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and student takes place in a situation in which both address their act of cognition to the object by which they are mediated. Thus, the dialogical character of education as the practice of freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets with the students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather

when the former first asks her or himself *what* she or he will dialogue with the latter *about.* And preoccupation with the content of dialogue is really preoccupation with the program content of education.

5.EDUCATION AND DIALOGUE

For the anti-dialogical banking educator, the question of content simply concerns the program about which he will discourse to his students; and he answers his own question, by organizing his own program. For the dialogical, problem-posing teacher-student, the program content of education is neither a gift nor an imposition bits of information to be deposited in the students, but rather the organized, systematized, and developed "re-presentation" to individuals of the things about which they want to know more.

Authentic education is not carried on by "A" *for* "B" or by "A" *about* "B," but rather by "A" *with* "B," mediated by the world-a world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views or opinions about it. These views, impregnated with anxieties, doubts, hopes, or hopelessness, imply significant themes on the basis of which the program content of education can be built. In its desire to create an ideal model of the "good man," a naïvely conceived humanism often overlooks the concrete, existential, present situation of real people. Authentic humanism consists in permitting the emergence of the awareness of our full humanity, as a condition and as an obligation, as a situation and as

a project. We simply cannot go to the laborers, urban or peasant in the banking style, to give them "knowledge" or to impose upon them the model of the "good man" contained in a program whose content we have ourselves organized. Many political and educational plans have failed because their authors designed them according to their own personal views of reality, never once taking into account (except as mere objects of their actions) the *men-in-a-situation* to whom their program was ostensibly directed.

For the truly humanist educator and the authentic revolutionary, the object of action is the reality to be transformed by them together with other people not other men and women themselves. The oppressors are the ones who act upon the people to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a reality which must remain untouched. Unfortunately, however, in their desire to obtain the support of the people for revolutionary action, revolutionary leaders often fall for the banking line of planning program content from the top down. They approach the peasant or urban masses with projects which may correspond to their own view of the world, but not to that of the people. They forget that their fundamental objective is to fight alongside the people for the recovery of the people's stolen humanity, not to "win the people over" to their side. Such a phrase does not belong in the vocabulary of revolutionary leaders, but in that of the oppressor. The revolutionary's role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people not to win them over.

In their political activity, the dominant elites utilize the banking concept to encourage passivity in the oppressed, corresponding with the latter's "submerged" state of consciousness, and take advantage of that passivity to "fill" that consciousness with slogans which create even more fear of freedom. This practice is incompatible with a truly liberating course of action, which, by presenting the oppressor's slogans as a problem, helps the oppressed to "eject" those slogans from within themselves. After all the task of the humanists is surely not that of pitting their slogans against the slogans of the oppressors, with the oppressed as the testing ground, "housing" the slogans of first one group and then the other. On the contrary, the task of the humanists is to see that the oppressed become aware of the fact that as dual beings, "housing" the oppressors within themselves, they cannot be truly human.

This task implies that revolutionary leaders do not go to the people in order to bring them a message of "salvation," but in order to come to know through dialogue with them both their *objective situation* and their *awareness* of that situation the various levels of perception of themselves and of the world in which and with which they exist. One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program constitutes cultural invasion, good intentions notwithstanding.

The starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the aspirations of the people. Utilizing certain basic contradictions, we must pose this existential, concrete, present situation to the people as a problem which challenges them and requires a response — not just at the intellectual level, but at the level of action.

We must never merely discourse on the present situation, must never provide the people with programs which have little or nothing to do with their own preoccupations, doubts, hopes, and fears programs which at times in fact increase the fears of the oppressed consciousness. It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view neither of the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in their action, reflects their *situation* in the world. Educational and political action which is not critically aware of this situation runs the risk either of "banking" or of preaching in the desert.

Often, educators and politicians speak and are not understood because their language is not attuned to the concrete situation of the people they address. Accordingly their talk is just alienated and alienating rhetoric. The language of the educator or the politician (and it seems more and more clear that the latter must also become

an educator, in the broadest sense of the word), like the language of the people, cannot exist without thought; and neither language nor thought can exist without a structure to which they refer. In order to communicate effectively educator and politician must understand the structural conditions in which the thought and language of the people are dialectically framed.

It is to the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of that reality held by educators and people, that we must go to find the program content of education. The investigation of what I have termed the people's "thematic universe" the complex of their ''generative themes'' inaugurates the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom. The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in regard to these themes. Consistent with the liberating purpose of dialogical education, the object of the investigation is not persons (as if they were anatomical fragments), but rather the thought language with which men and women refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world, in which their generative themes are found.

6.HUMANIZING VERSUS ANIMALIZING: A GENERATIVE THEME IN EDUCATION AND CONCLUSION

Before describing a "generative theme" more precisely, which will also clarify what is meant by a "minimum thematic universe," it seems to me indispensable to present a few preliminary reflections. The concept of a generative theme is neither an arbitrary invention nor a working hypothesis to be proved. If it were a hypothesis to be proved, the initial investigation would seek not to ascertain the nature of the theme, but rather the very existence or non-existence of themes themselves. In that event, before attempting to understand the theme in its richness, its significance, its plurality, its transformations, and its historical composition, we would first have to verify whether or not it is an objective fact; only then could we proceed to apprehend it. Although an attitude of critical doubt is legitimate, it does appear possible to verify the reality of the generative them   not only through one's own existential experience, but also through critical reflection on the human world relationship and on the relationships between people implicit in the former.

This point deserves more attention. One may well remember trite as it seems that, of the uncompleted beings, man is the only one to treat not only his actions but his very self as the object of his reflection; this capacity distinguishes him from the animals, which are unable to separate themselves from their activity and thus are unable to reflect upon it. In this apparently superficial distinction lie the boundaries which delimit the action of each in his life space.

Because the animals' activity is an extension of themselves, the results of that activity are also inseparable from themselves; animals can neither set objectives nor infuse their transformation of nature with any significance beyond itself. Moreover, the "decision" to perform this activity belongs not to them but to their species. Animals are, accordingly, fundamentally "beings in themselves."

Unable to decide for themselves, unable to objectify either themselves or their activity, lacking objectives which they themselves have set, living "submerged" in a world to which they can give no meaning, lacking a "tomorrow" and a "today" because they exist in an overwhelming present, animals are ahistorical. Their ahistorical life does not occur in the "world," taken in its strict meaning; for the animal, the world does not constitute a "not-I" which could set him apart as an "I." The human world, which is historical, serves as a mere prop for the "being in itself." Animals are not challenged by the configuration which confronts them; they are merely stimulated. Their life is not one of risk-taking, for they are not aware of taking risks. Risks are not challenges perceived upon reflection, but merely "noted" by the signs which indicate them; they accordingly do not require decision-making responses.

Consequently, animals cannot commit themselves. Their ahistorical condition does not permit them to "take on" life. Because they do not "take it on," they cannot construct it; and if they do not construct it, they cannot transform its configuration.

Nor can they know themselves to be destroyed by life, for they cannot expand their "prop" world into a meaningful, symbolic world which includes culture and history. As a result animals do not "animalize" their configuration in order to animalize themselves nor do they "deanimalize" themselves. Even in the forest, they remain "beings-in-themselves," as animal-like there as in the zoo. In contrast the people aware of their activity and the world in which they are situated, acting in function of the objectives which they propose, having the seat of their decisions located in themselves and in their relations with the world and with others, infusing the world with their creative presence by means of the transformation they effect upon it unlike animals, not only live but exist; and their existence is historical. Animals live out their lives on an a temporal, flat, uniform "prop"; humans exist in a world which they are constantly re-creating and transforming.

Humans, however, because they are aware of themselves and thus of the world because they are *conscious beings* exist in a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own freedom. As they separate themselves from the world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world and others, people overcome the situations which limit them: the "limit-situations." Once perceived by individuals as fetters, as obstacles to their liberation, these situations stand out in relief from the background, revealing their

true nature as concrete historical dimensions of a given reality. Men and women respond to the challenge with actions directed at negating and overcoming, rather than passively accepting, the given. Thus, it is not the limit-situations in and of themselves which create a climate of hopelessness, but rather how they are perceived by women and men at a given historical moment: whether they appear as fetters or as insurmountable barriers. As critical perception is embodied in action, a climate of hope and confidence develops which leads men to attempt to overcome the limit-situations. This objective can be achieved only through action upon the concrete, historical reality in which limit-situations historically are found. As reality is transformed and these situations are superseded, new ones will appear; which in turn will evoke new limit-acts.

The prop world of animals contains no limit-situations, due to its ahistorical character. Similarly, animals lack the ability to exercise limit-acts, which require a decisive attitude towards the world: separation from and objectification of the world in order to transform it. Organically bound to their prop, animals do not distinguish between themselves and the world. Accordingly, animals are not limited by limit-situations which are historical but rather by the entire prop. And the appropriate role for animals is not to relate to their prop (in that event the prop would be a world), but to adapt to it. Thus, when animals "produce" a nest, a hive, or a burrow, they are not creating products which result from "limit-

acts," that is, transforming responses. Their productive activity is subordinated to the satisfaction of a physical necessity which is simply stimulating, rather than challenging. "An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product.

Only products which result from the activity of a being but do not belong to its physical body (though these products may bear its seal), can give a dimension of meaning to the context, which thus becomes a world. A being capable of such production (who thereby is necessarily aware of himself is a "being for himself" could no longer *be* if she or he were not *in the process of being* in the world with which he or she relates; just as the world would no longer exist if this being did not exist.

From the foregoing discussion, this paper underscores pedagogical reforms as key in every educational reform efforts.

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