

**BORDERS, IDENTITIES AND KIN POLITICS IN THE BALKANS:  
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AT THE TURKISH-BULGARIAN BORDER**

Nurcan Özgür BAKLACIOĞLU

**Abstract**

*The paper focuses upon the historical and social construction of various crossborder identities across Turkish-Bulgarian border and elaborates the role of the border minorities, dual citizens and local kin politics on the development of the economic, political and cultural cooperation across the border. While the post-communist opening of the border led to the formation of new crossborder actors such as seasonal migrants, dual citizens, border minorities, irregular migrants, twin associations, schools, municipalities and free trade zones, the Europeanisation of the border gives rise to new physical, electronic and digital fences and walls. The paper questions the possible outcomes of the interactions that take place amidst this binary top-down and bottom-up dynamics. The question of how Europeanisation of the border could affect the local social, political, economic and cultural structures and dynamics? lays at the core of the study.*

**Introduction**

During the last decade, border studies have come a long way from the study of the hard territorial line separating states within the international system to the contemporary study of borders as a process of bordering, symbols and perceptions, through which territories and peoples are respectively included or excluded. (Newman, 2003; 2006). Once thought to be rigid, the lines and borders are as flexible as they were reflecting new territorial and aspatial patterns of human behaviour. The modern digital and cyber technologies has deminished the traditional barrier role of borders, while have served to create new sets of symbolic, social and administrative borders and boundaries that enclose groups with common identities and interests dispersed all around the world. The new networked borders do not require territorial attachment.

As Paasi (1998) underlines the borders are not anymore simple lines drawn on a map but they are institutions which possess their own internal rules and functions and their own mechanisms..Emphasizing the performative role of the borders, Scott (2006) suggests that the borders are not just institutions but elements of everyday procedures that lies deeply embedded within society. These procedures are identified and work throug ideologies, behaviors and perceptions and are resembled through symbols, principles and norms.

The borders are social and ideological inventions that perform certain functions. Through their institutional and procedural functions, the borders define “*who is us*” and “*who are the others*”, they impose entry and exit conditions and act as “*filters*” that determine the degree of permeability of individuals, ideas and principles. They have the capacity to separate, categorize and select the political, social, economic and geographic differences. They function as barriers that exclude and include, prevent or allow the entrances and exists in a group, society, institution or territory. However, as the Janus face of the borders suggests, the borders and border zones provide also places of contact, interaction, and hybridity that bridges different cultures, ideas, ideologies, performances and social entities.

The Balkan history used to be constructed under the discourse of the traditional territorial conception of the borders. The territorial and ethnogeographical hostilities and nationalist historiographies used to emphasize the conflictual and dividing function of the borders. Nevertheless, with its ethnic, historical and religious composition and hybridity the Balkans present one of the most fruitful area to investigate the complex Janus faced nature of the borders as physical, political, social and symbolic constructions that not only separate, delineate and divide, but also bridge, meet and combine.

### **Historical and Socio-Political Construction of Crossborder Identities in the Balkans**

In the Balkan historiography the borders convey the traditional ethno-territorial meaning of the border as a place of fear and threat. The history of the borders in this region is more about the border as a subject of power relations and imposition of the Great powers. The demarcation, delimitation and ultimate location of boundaries are a function of power relations, while the territorial legacy of partition, division and boundary superimposition remains a prominent component in the Balkan map today. The boundary superimposition lies at the core of many local conflicts in the region. The borders symbolize not only the interrupted nation-building and shifting sovereignty, but also divided identities and histories as well. The borders in the Balkans demarcated and delineated the sovereignty of the nation-states, but also constituted traumatic gates for millions of forced migrants, exchanged populations, refugees etc. Only the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78 resulted in deaths of millions and emigration of 1.445.000 Muslim refugees from the Bulgarian to Anatolian lands. (Eren, 1993:298) Thus a mutual geography of fear and pain has maintained untangible separation between people who have been driven from their homes to the “other” side of the boundary.

The most painful years of the late-Ottoman Balkan history are the years following the Balkan wars. Intertwined with ethno-territorial wars and exoduses the nation-building processes in the region emphasized the borders primarily as military zones and war stages. Militarization of the national borders had been a necessary condition against any external hostile aspirations and territorial claims that led to

the Balkan Wars and WWI and WWII. The wars ended with forced emigrations of millions from both Balkans(Ağanoğlu, 2001) and Anatolia and numerous bilateral border agreements to recognise, order, regulate, manage and control the borders as national barriers. Known as the Ottoman gate to the Gorgeous Roumeli,i.e. Balkans, the Bulgarian-Turkish border zone undergone subsequent Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish alegations and invasions until Lausane Treaty declared the official Bulgarian-turkish border in 1923. The Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian collonisation and nationalisation of the occupied Ottoman lands after the WWI (Stokes,1998: 25-30) followed by forced deportations of the Ottoman population from Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia(Noel Malcolm,1999:342). According to Ottoman Migration Commision, between years 1919-1926 198.688(Şimşir,1986) refugees from Bulgaria and 131.000 refugees from Kingdom of Yugoslavia crossed the Bulgarian-Turkish border towards Anatolia. The Bulgarianisation of the Pomak population in Southwestern Bulgaria between 1931-35 led to forced migration of Pomak villages to the Eastern Thracean part of the Turkish-Bulgarian border. During 1930's the fashist Koseivanov government deported Turkish intellectuals in Bulgaria. The territorial exchanges and the shifts at the Romanian-Bulgarian border in Dobrucea resulted in the emigration of Tatars and Turks. Following the proclamation the Turkish Republic the Bulgarian-Turkish border undergone passages of approximatelly 1.519.368 Muslims and Turks (Eren, 1966:91) (Table 1) and 30-50.000 Thracean Bulgarians and Armenians (in 1913).

**Table 1: Balkan Migrations to Anatolia**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Yugoslavia</b>	<b>Romania</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Bulgaria</b>
<b>1912-1913</b>				<b>440.000</b>
<b>1923-1939</b>	115.427	117.095	384.000	198.688
<b>1940-1945</b>	1.671	4.201	-	15.744
<b>1946-1960</b>	152.003	55	23.808	154.112
<b>1961-1970</b>	30.502	274	2.081	15.000
<b>1971-1980</b>	1.797	136	-	116.104
<b>1981-1990</b>	2.623	760	-	178.664*
<b>1993-1997</b>				77.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>304.023</b>	<b>122.521</b>	<b>409.889</b>	<b>749.648</b>
<b>General Total</b>				<b>2.026.081</b>

**Source:** (Şimşir, 1986), (Kirisci, “Post Second...”, 1995:175-80)

\* Jivkov yönetiminin devrilmesinden sonra Bulgaristan'a geri dönen 133.272 göçmen hariç tutulmuştur.

These interwar processes of national and territorial socialization constructed national identities with national territory as a major component of identity construction in the region. The constitutive significance of the territory is one of the major legacies of the interwar history in the Balkans. So, the borders in the interwar Balkans constituted indivisible part of the territorial and national identity. Most of the historical animosities and conflicts today lie at this period of Balkan history.

The post-WWII history of socialist federalization has frozen the territorial conflicts in the region. National borders have been subsumed as internal administrative borders in the Soviet or Yugoslav federations, while others delineated the Warsaw Zone. During the communist era the borders in the Balkans constituted geographies of exclusion that separated two ideological camps. The main function of the borders at that time was to provide the invisibility of the “other” side. The invisibility itself created a new Cold War dimension of fear emanating from the capitalist side of the border. The Bulgarian, Yugoslavian borders and the Berlin Wall had been institutionalized as borders of the two hegemonic ideologies of the Cold War. Common characteristic of these borders is an underdeveloped border zones under threat of occupation during potential war, no extensive investments, local colonizations and displacement of the autochthone populations.

The post-WWII migration era (Castles & Miller, 2008) was based on social and economic modernization and ideological competition across the two sides of the Berlin Wall. The Bulgarian-Turkish border faced with political asylum movements between the Eastern and Western Block. 31% of the Balkan immigrants who came to Turkey until 1960 came from Bulgaria and 22.4% from Yugoslavia. (Geray: 6-12) The socialist and nationalisation reforms raised radical social, cultural and political borders in the front of the Muslim populations in these countries. Forceful defeat of the minority opposition to the Stalinist reforms resulted in forced emigration of 250.000 Bulgarian Muslims and Turks (Stoyanov, 1992: 10-11) and from 151.889 up to 412.000 Muslims and Turks from Yugoslavia. (Özgür Baklacioğlu, 2010)

However, in the post-Stalinist era the people in the communist Balkans did not experience the borders between the Republics of ex-Yugoslavia or the other communist states (except Albania) as a barrier. Without difficulties they worked across the borders, attended nearby schools irrespective of the border side, owned and cultivated agrarian land in cross-border area, intermarried and maintained various intensive daily crossborder contacts across the borders. During these years the Bulgarian-Turkish border performed as an external border of the communist block that connects the Eastern Europe with the Middle East.

During 90's the borders in the Balkans faced controversial binary phenomena. After the break down of the Berlin Wall, the internal borders of the Warsaw area of freedom of movement turned into external borders of the new liberal democratic states. Throughout wars, ethnic cleansing and new territorial agreements the internal borders of the Yugoslavian federation became external borders of new independent

states. The border regimes changed, and affected the perception and performances of the borders and the borderlanders. Similar to the interwar years the ethnic and religious identity of the populations settled across the borders gained significance and led to new securitization of the borders. Years after WWII the borders in the Balkans constituted again a geography of fear, exile and conflict. After the Great Excursion of Bulgarian Turkish refugees in 1989, the Bulgarian-Turkish border undergone mass refugee inflows of 35.000 Bosnian (1993-95), 15.000 Kosovo (1997-98) and 6.151 Macedonian Turkish (after March 2001) refugees.

The fear of spread of potential regional war found reflection in rearticulation of the borders as bridges for cooperation and friendship. In 1993 the Bulgarian-Turkish Friendship Agreement underlined the significance of the 1925 Agreement which arranged enjoyable opportunities of movement, employment and migration across the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In the late-90's both countries had reached agreements for the demilitarisation of the border regions and signed an agreement for clearance of the mine zones and lower customs and tax regime for the Turkish trucks across the border. ("Bulgarian and Turkish Ministers...", 2002) Some military units had been removed or shifted from the border. The Bulgarian border constituted one of the busiest commercial and migratory borders opening for Europe. The end of the Cold War promoted the regional commercial and private traffic as well. According to the Edirne Municipality data in year 1990-93 the border crossings had reached 8.302.472 per year ("Sınır Kapıları", 2002). Although a good part of these crossings constituted of Iraqi refugees escaping the Gulf War on the way to Germany, there was important number of local visitors and suitcase traders.

During the interwar years the Bulgarian textile and leather production in Gabrovo used to exchange its products with the Bulgarian merchants in Eminonu, İstanbul. During 90's the Turkish middle and small range business from Turkey started to discover the small markets and cheap labor of Bulgaria and Romania. The İstanbul market profited through the suitcase trade with the small Eastern European merchants, while at the same time taught the free market rules to the new-born Bulgarian businessman. The crossborder social linkages and networks of the Turkish minority produced important crossborder regional economies integrated into new trans-border and trans-national geographies during 90's. After each great economic crisis in Bulgaria, the diminishing mass unemployment in the minority regions triggered increase in the labor emigrations to Turkey. Family-to-family linkages among the Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey facilitated the intensification of economic migrations to Turkey during 90's. Beside the Turkey's strict visa prohibition for the Bulgarian Turks, the number of the irregular Bulgarian Turkish immigrants in Turkey exceeded 76.000, while the registered ones were only 33.123. ("İçişleri Bakanı Meral...", 1997:11-12) After the facilitation of the EU visa requirements for Eastern European citizens in 2001 the family and kin networks in Western Europe prevailed. The border crossings at the Bulgarian -Turkish border fall to 1.198.516 crossings in 2001.

The available data talks about 30.000 Bulgarian Turks in Sweden, 10-30.000 in Netherlands and 1000 in Austria. (Laczko,;2002, 187; The Sophia Echo, 2009) The real numbers of the Bulgarian Turkish economic seasonal migrants in the Western Europe surpass the available data, because there is constant circulation of labour between the minority regions and Western European countries. The main reasons for the emigration to Turkey or Western Europe are (Маева&Манчева, 2004) :

- Shut down schools, unemployed Turkish teachers, low educational levels amongst the minority children
- Emptied villages as result of emigration to the cities, Turkey or Western Europe
- Unemployment rate 80%
- EU minority development projects applied selectively and insufficiently, primarily in the Pomak and Roma minority regions
- Underdeveloped infrastructure, Low investments
- seasonal migration opportunities in Western Europe
- Organised employment networks established between the Western Europe and the minority villages in Bulgaria
- Illegal employment, low wages, social insecurity

While the labor emigration to Turkey leads to irregularization of the stay and employment and ends up into permanent emigration to Turkey, the labor emigration to Western Europe is under temporary legal residence and illegal employment managed and organised through work-finding agents or village Networks. The field interviews show that the labor emigration to Western Europe rarely ends up into permanent emigration, instead, the accumulation of the migrant resources promotes the inter migration in Bulgaria, ie permanent emigration from the village to the city that provides sufficient education opportunities for the children. If there was an opportunity for legal residence in Turkey and promotion of the seasonal employment than the tendency for permanent emigration to Turkey would decrease. The post-communist crossborder movements across the border raised new actors with various identities, performances and expectations across the border.

### **New Actors, New Performances in the Crossborder Sites**

The closest minority that are involved into daily crossborder activity and exchange are the Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. The most part of the seasonal and irregular migrants, as well as suitcase traders in Turkey is constituted by Turks and Roma that live in border cities such as Haskovo, Svilengrad, Kırçali and Burgaz. There are also about 862.712 (in year 2000) and 401.597 (in 2001) gurbetchi tourists that cross the border each summer on the way to Anatolia. ("Kapikule Sezona...", 2001) The minority migrants and dual citizens that immigrated and settled in the Thracian border region after 1989 constitute the second active crossborder group that is more interested in family business and trade of

Bulgarian foods at the small “Bulgarian immigrant market kiosks” in İstanbul. Banitsa, boza, vafla, salami, Bulgarian cheese and yoghurt are some of the numerous communist-time tastes that take place at these migrant shop shelves.

The primary institutional actors across the border are the small business companies and small range investors. The number of the Turkish companies that invested in Bulgaria during 90’s had reached the number of 1100. Many of them went bankrupt, the biggest ones are concentrated in construction, tourism, textile etc. sectors. The free trade zones and Plovdiv and Edirne Trade Fairs provide the most important channels for the regional crossborder cooperation and exchange across the border. Between 1992- 2001 Haskovo border municipality attracted 41.64 million USD in foreign investments. As a border city the economy of Svilengrad depends a lot on the crossborder free trade zones extending to the Greek and Turkish sides of the border and the Svilengrad-Edirne municipality cooperation. Important limit to the strengthening of this cooperation is partly the ethnic background of the population of Svilengrad which became a city of colonisation after 1913 when Bulgarian refugees from Western and Eastern Thrace had been settled around.

Bulgarian Side	Turkish Side
Seasonal migrants Retired dual citizens Thrace Bulgarians Bulgarian Turks Roma Bulgarian Tourists	Migrant associations Dual citizens Minority migrants
Gurbetchi (European Turks) Twin municipalities Free Trade Zones Universities	

Acting continuously across the border most of these actors undergone dual processes of political and territorial socialization. So, typical for these new actors are dual attachment and affiliation to two different places, territories and social spaces. Especially the Bulgarian Turkish minority and dual citizen migrants have developed extensive cultural, economic, political links and performances across the border and transformed the border from a place of separation into place of linkage and new local, mixed identifications. (Figure 2).

Political parties and NGOs play a key role for social, political and cultural integration of minorities - including their adequate representation in decision-making process at local, regional and national levels.

As globalization extended the role of migrant communities through internal restructuring, higher capacity of mobility and access to information the migrant communities expanded their sphere of activity from culture to politics. This functional change led to diasporization of migrant communities as in the case of Bulgarian Turkish migrants which started collective action for their social rights left behind in Bulgaria. The search for social compensation mobilised crossborder political action of the migrant associations around the discourse of human rights and freedoms. Crossborder elections constitute fruitful stage for the lobbying and

propaganda performances of these actors. The associations use to put pressure over the minority leaders and the leaders in Turkey, mobilize and register the electoral vote in Turkey and prepare the electoral stages, as well as in some cases monitor the elections themselves. They are also involved in advising and reporting on the human rights problems and cultural expectations of the minority in Bulgaria.



As defenders of the migrants rights, the migrant associations are the prime opponents of the nationalistic claims among some Bulgarian associations in Bulgaria too. Based on the fact that most of the association leaders have personal and commercial affairs with Bulgaria, they do not feel independent enough to apply harsh opposition against the Bulgarian governments. Neither there is clear opposition against the aspirations of the Thracian Associations in Bulgaria. This is a union of associations of the Bulgarians and Armenians who emigrated from Eastern Thrace after September 1913. Organised under rather nationalist propaganda, these diasporic groups claim for financial compensations for their lost properties at the Thracian frontiers at the Turkish side of the border. Their attachment to this “sacred territory” is based around symbols, signs and myths (Bulgarian and Armenian churches, cemeteries, village names, schools etc.) in the landscape, as well as the creation of territorial histories and myths which reflect the holyness of this exclusive ancestral homeland called once upon a time Odrin kingdom of Bulgarians. Yet, there is not direct face to face quarrel between the migrant associations at the both sides of the border, the claims fight through the governments.

Important competition goes among some anti-Dogan associations in Turkey and the MRF leader in Bulgaria. Some of the associations use to question the legitimacy, performance and efectivty of the MRF’s leadership and ask for radical change at the top of the minority party. The electoral performance of the MRF and its ability to overcome the legal and political pressure of the nationalist circles in Bulgaria, provide the MRF with sufficient capacity to afford these opponent voices. Moreover, MRF as a minority party that represent only 5-7% of the electoral vote has representations in 28 municipalities, 247 districts, 2128 quarters where it is



represented by 68.000 members (in 2003-2006) and 24.000 members in the Youth organisation of MRF. Through this wide organisation the MRF supports higher political and administrative representation of the Turkish minority elite in the parties, bureaucracy, politics, i.e. enlarges the political elite among the minorities.

The MRF's Turkey sponsored quota for high education in Turkey provided high education opportunities for up to 1500 minority members. There are more than 20.000 Bulgarian students abroad that are sponsored by the Bulgarian government, but there is no available data about the representation of the minorities in this quota. The schooling and employment problems and the absence of effective social policies in the minority regions leads to low education quality among the minorities. Although approached as a threat to Bulgarian unity and a privilege, the high education opportunities provided in Turkey and the crossborder vote provide important ground reproducing the cultural identity of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria as well as opens new perspectives for common action and hopes for future projections among the young minority members. Doubtlessly, these crossborder activities provide a social tool for creating an active cross-border cultural space, yet, this cultural space works within the cultural, political and economic sphere of the minority and involves low number of Bulgarians. The anti-Roma and anti-Turkish feelings among the nationalist Bulgarians are still strong. For example there are only few cases of twin municipality initiatives that meet a Bulgarian and Turkish populated municipalities. While the migrant Networks and cultural affiliation constituted the basic reasons for establishing twin municipalities, after the Europeanisation economic factors and efforts for requisition of the EU funds dominated in the initiation of twin municipalities.

So far, beside the dual citizen migrants and the local business, the most EU-involved active crossborder actors are the twin border municipalities. They head, take part or overtake the coordination of many local crossborder economic, cultural and societal cooperation initiatives that usually involve the local NGO's too. As it is well known not always the interests of these institutional crossborder actors represent the expectations of the minorities, very often these institutions and groups take under consideration the kin-state sensitivities and convey different cultural values and norms. For example, in an attempt to isolate the impact of some radical Islamic sects such as Rabita, Suleymancılar etc. Turkish Diyanet is supporting the opening of some Islamic schools in Bulgaria, however, there are differences in the Islamic rituals and understanding at the two sides of the border. Thus these initiatives are perceived as imposition of foreign Islamic values among the Islamic circles in Bulgaria.

The rise of the Bulgarian nationalism after 2008 constitutes the primary factor that hampers the development of crossborder cooperation through activation of ethnic and historical bias and hostility, populist nationalism, revanchism, corruption, unstable political life etc.. The absence of common competencies and low foreign capital investment in border zones results in ad hoc, less institutionalised, temporary cultural cooperation.

**Conclusion: Europeanisation of the Border: Eurozone Cooperation on New physical, Electronic and Digital Fences and Walls.**

How Europeanisation of the border could affect the local social, political, economic and cultural structures and dynamics?: EU enlargement created a new eastern border in the Eastern Europe. This borderline goes through areas inhabited by people who belong to 71 minorities (Toth,2006:21), thus speak numerous different languages, but share the values, culture and memories of the same communist past. Beside the ethno-territorial problems and claims, there are many cultural, moral and historical similarities as legacies of the communist education, social life and cultural policies. This is one of the factors that tends to support the local crossborder initiatives. For example few years after the Balkan wars the former Yugoslav republics removed the visa limitations and initiated crossborder freedom of movement, exchange and cooperation.

The introduction of the Schengen regime and the Europeanisation of some of the borders in the Southeastern Europe defeated the traditional local crossborder dynamics and brought new competitions and inequalities among the new EU-members and non-EU member states. Since the Schengen system is fundamentally about re-interpreting national borders and their meanings in regard to the movement of persons, it created a borderless or semi-open world for some and a new “iron curtain” for the other states in the region. Avoiding to import the local minority conflicts and poor immigrants, the EU placed aside the social ties, cultural proximity or ethnic origin as main criteria in its border management policies. (Hatvany,2006:49) However, as most of the new member states undergone problems related to crossborder kin minority policies or kin state affiliation(Hatvany,2006:49), they started to put pressure on the EU justice, freedom, security agenda and call for flexibility of border crossing policy has started to put pressure on the EU agenda.

The introduction of the Schengen border code and visa policies interrupted the local habits of crossborder movement and caused indirect losses in the tourism and local market sector. In the case of Turkey and Bulgaria there is a continuity in the implementation of the visa policy, but there has been increase in the Bulgarian visa cost for the Turkish citizens. Although the Schengen system foresees visa facilitation for the citizens of the candidate states that provides a right to enjoy visa-free travel up to 90 days, this provision is not applied to the Turkish citizens. The costly and hardly obtainable Bulgarian visa prevents the growth of tourism between Bulgaria and Turkey. While Bulgarian citizens are provided the right to stay 3 months in Turkey with a tourist visa, the Turkish citizens undergo strict visa and registration practices. As a result, beside its wide variety of alternative touristic opportunities Bulgaria hosts small number of tourists from Turkey (except the dual citizens), while Turkey is one of the favoured tourism sites for the vacational tourism.

Turkey is also a transit country for refugees and migrants from the South Asia, Middle East and Africa, but also a source country for Turkish emigration to Europe and receiving country for irregular migration from former Soviet Union. Since 90's there has been an intensified grass roots movement from below which challenges the continuous functional norms of the border. However, except the liberalised mobility of the dual citizens, twin municipality governors, businessmen, these local factors support the securitization of the bordering and migratory processes. After the deadly experience of the restrictive visa policies applied to kin-minority members during 90's, when in 1997 seven Bulgarian Turkish children were found dead in a traffickers truck while passing illegally to Turkey. Turkey took one-sided legislative, administrative measures to limit the negative effects of visa policies. However this kin-minority facilitation is temporary, applied only before the parliamentary elections, and involve temporary single renewal of the residence permit. Because of the 3 months limitation of the stay in Turkey, hundreds of Bulgarian Turks are living in irregular status in Turkey. Because of this they do not have access to citizenship application until completed 10 years of residence. After the Europeanisation of the visa procedure, the law on work and residence conditions of the Turks and other kin immigrants in Turkey is not applicable anymore.

There are available additional administrative mechanisms to limit the negative impact of return, border and visa regimes imposed through Europeanisation. These measures are not in conflict with the EU regulations and involve application of ethnic preferences in migration regulation and naturalisation, provision of trans-border nationality status for minorities or liberal visa for minority visitors, labourers, suitcase traders, students etc.

One of the most successful performances of the crossborder kin policy was the accommodation of the dual citizenship status. This status "solved" the issues of social rights and retirement problems of the migrants of 1989. Most of the aged migrants had to buy their already installed retirement years from the Bulgarian government or most simply got satisfied by minimum retirement salaries in Turkey and Bulgaria. The highest advantage of the dual citizenship policy was the facilitation of the crossborder travel of the minority migrants of 1989. Yet the minority itself does not enjoy such freedom of travel to Turkey. Moreover, the Bulgaria's dual citizenship policy bases on ethnic origin and kin solidarity. It is employed as a nation building tool and strengthens the spirit of the ethnic majority in post-communist Bulgaria.

So far, the Europeanisation of the border has resulted in modernisation, technological improvement and professionalisation of the borders as institutions under integrated border management programs. Now there are more effective, digitalised, selective, fast, clever and moving borders. The borders are connected through extensive digital data and networks and share immense information and data about the people who can pass and who cannot pass the border. Today the borders know and distance the ethnic, religious, professional, social background and fingerprint of each foreigner who pass the Europeanised borders. So in the case of

Bulgarian-Turkish borders we see a shift from demilitarized national borders to securitized and marketized European borders. For difference from the Cold War times, the rules and regulations governing the border today are changed not by gendarmeria or military bodies, but by policy decision makers, through built-in adaptive mechanisms such as internal auditing. Europeanisation does not require governments to relinquish control of the borders, instead EU integrated border management system requires standardized and optimized border structures. The increase in the illegal passages and human trafficking applies strong challenge over the border functions from below.

The Europeanisation as a process of standardization across the borders, leads to immense degree of interaction and cooperation to take place between the border administrations at the both sides of the border. Integrated border Management foresees common border checkpoints, crossborder cooperation in risk and data analysis and exchange, education, orientation, coordination, patrolling etc(Akman&Kılınç,2010:9).The data systems, criteria and mentality of selection, functions and approaches against irregular migration and human trafficking are common. There is intensive SIS and Eurodac-based digital interaction between the border police at the two sides of the border. Co-operation in the field of migration and asylum through protection of human rights of (lawful) migrants; co-operation to improve security standards (biometrics in travel documents); functional border control and staffing, concluding readmission agreements; collaboration with sending, transit and destination countries in asylum management; and promotion of public awareness about the opportunities and limits of individuals' rights in migratory movement.

Regardless of the absence of direct reference on minorities, the overall security context may indirectly support the utilitarian approach by taking minorities into account as security issues on fringes of Europe. (Toth,2006:25) Indeed the European Parliament Regulation on local border traffic at the external borders of the EU about the border residents crossing of borders is not implemented at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. (Toth,2006:34) In fact, Bulgaria as a member states may conclude agreements on local border traffic with neighbouring third countries or maintain existing agreements provided that these agreements comply with the Regulation. Here the local historical and political prejudices and interests play role.

“Bottom up” development of European integration at its borders (Gabbe 2006) bases on the idea that only actors from the cross-border region can efficiently design developmental tasks and projects, which fit to broader developmental strategies at regional, state or Community level. there are limits and shortcomings of such endeavour: The Shengen regime impose a new border-the EU border b/w an EU member and non-member state, these are two different statuses and positions that create inequality and marginalisation of the non-member part in the participation in any crossborder or regional developmental program. Very often the crossborder developmental programmes require the applicant party from non-EU member states to

provide higher percent (around 15 %) of the total eligible cost, thus the non-member part faces both financial shortcomes or problems in fulfilling of eligibility criteria..

This dual situation across the Schengen border leads to new competitions that merge with the old local ethnic or national competitions for power, i.e. municipal government, public services and resource distribution. This leads to more segregation where ethnic groups create their own distinct and homogeneous cultural spaces, send their own representatives to the local municipalities and compete for resources along distinct ethnic and sectoral interests across the border.

## References

“Bulgarian and Turkish Ministers Discuss Cross-Border Projects in Sofia”, *Balkan Times*, Source: <http://www.balkantimes.com/html2/english/default.htm>, Reached: 30 July 2002.

“İçişleri Bakanı Meral Akşener’in Konuşması”, *Genel Kurul Tutanağı*, 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 60. Birleşim, Ankara, 28 Şubat 1997, s.11-12.

“Kapıkule Sezona Hazırlanıyor”, *Hürriyetim İnetim*, Source: <http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/01/05/26/turkiye/htl>, Reached: 26 May 2001

“Sınır Kapıları”, *Edirne Belediyesi Web Sayfası*, December 2002.

Akman, Adem, İsmail Kılınç, “AB’de Entegre Sınır Yönetiminin Gelişimi ve AB sürecinde Türkiye’nin Entegre Sınır Yönetimine Geçiş Çalışmaları”, *Türk İdare Dergisi*, Sayı 467, Haziran 2010, p.9.

Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008.

Donnan, Hastings and Tom Wilson. 1999. *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*. Berg: Oxford.

Eren, 1966:91

Gabbe, Jens. 2006. Importance of Cross-border Cooperation. Speech on the occasion of the INTERACT Seminar on Cross-border Cooperation, 14 June 2006, Riga. Available on: [http://www.interact-eu.net/interact\\_studies/63](http://www.interact-eu.net/interact_studies/63), (last visit: 10 August 2009).

George C. Petrakos, The Regional Structure of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece: Implications for Cross-Border Cooperation and Development *European Urban and Regional Studies July 1997 4: 195-210, doi:10.1177/096977649700400301*

Geray, Cevat s. 6-12

Hatvany, Csilla. “Legitimacy of Kin-State Politics: A Theoretical Approach”, *Regio: Minorities, Politics, Society*, Vol.9, 2006, p. 49.

Kirisci, “Post Second...”, 1995:175-80

Knežević Hočevar, Duška. 2007. Ideologies of 'Fortress Europe' in two Slovenian-Croatian borderlands: case studies from Žumberak and Bela krajina. In: Armstrong, Warwick, James Anderson (eds.). Geopolitics of European Union enlargement: the fortress empire, (Transnationalism, Routledge research in transnationalism, 20). London; New York: Routledge, pp. 206-222.

Laczko, Frank; Stacher, Irene; Klekowski von Koppenfels, Amanda (2002). *New challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*. Cambridge University Press. p. 187. ISBN 90-6704-153-X

Newman, 2003; 2006)

Özgür Baklacioğlu, Nurcan. *Dış Politika ve Göç: Balkanlardan Türkiye'ye Arnavut Göçleri 1918-1980*, İstanbul: Der, 2010.

Paasi (1998)

Scott (2006)

Stoyanov, Valeri. *Bilgarskite Turtsi Sled Vtorata Svetovna Voyna*, Sofia, 1992, s.10-11.

Şimşir, Bilal, *Bulgaristan Türkleri 1878-1985*, İstanbul, Bilgi, 1986.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Bulgaristan Türkleri 1878-1985*, İstanbul, Bilgi, 1986

The SophiaEcho. "Turkish Bulgarians fastest-growing group of immigrants in the Netherlands". [http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/21/758628\\_turkish-bulgarians-fastest-growing-group-of-immigrants-in-the-netherlands](http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/21/758628_turkish-bulgarians-fastest-growing-group-of-immigrants-in-the-netherlands). Retrieved 2009-07-26.

Toth, Judith. "Relations of Kin State and Kin Minorities in the Shadow of the Schengen Regime", *Regio: Minorities, Politics, Society*, Vol.9, 2006, s.21

Маева, М., М. Манчева. (2004). Миграция на български турци (1878-2004). В: Султанова, Р. (съст.). *Български миграции и миграционни движения от 80-те години на XX в. до днес*. София.