The European Conditionality and the Legislation on Lobbying, Conflicts of Interest and the Fight against Corruption in the Balkans

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to outline the general characteristics of the legislation on lobbying and the fight against corruption in the decision-making process. This analysis – applied to the candidate countries of the Balkans – will be carried out based on two main reference points; first, the requirements of the European conditionality (which take into account international best practices) and secondly, the experience of the ‘new’ member States of the European Union. In particular, we intend to determine how the pressures of democratic conditionality have encouraged the adoption of a legal framework in line with European standards, even if the gap between the rules and their practical enforcement is quite significant. Also, we will reveal critical aspects of democratic conditionality, while at the same time emphasizing the cultural features of the Republics of the former Yugoslavia. These include not only their negative aspects and traits but also some powerful positive ones such as some interesting measures for ensuring civic participation in the decision-making process that were in place during the socialist era.