Realism: Philosophical and Scientific

dc.contributor.author	Marsonet, Michele
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-09T21:34:28Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-09T21:34:28Z
dc.date.issued	2020-01-03
dc.identifier.issn	2079-3715
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.epoka.edu.al/handle/1/1865
dc.description.abstract	What kind of realism - if any - are we allowed to endorse? It is often stated that, in order to provide realism with a solid foundation, we need having recourse to a reality that is totally independent of thought (and let alone of language). This is taken to be the key thesis of realism. But many philosophers reply that, even when we imagine a world totally devoid of human presence, we must use human concepts. From this point of view, conceptualization does not seem to be an optional we can get rid of, but rather a built-in component of the nature of human beings.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Academicus International Scientific Journal	en_US
dc.subject	realism	en_US
dc.subject	anti-realism	en_US
dc.subject	philosophical realism	en_US
dc.subject	science	en_US
dc.subject	scientific realism	en_US
dc.subject	metaphysics	en_US
dc.title	Realism: Philosophical and Scientific	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US