Philosophical Doubts about reality.

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dc.contributor.author Marsonet, Michele
dc.date.accessioned 2023-07-21T00:32:37Z
dc.date.available 2023-07-21T00:32:37Z
dc.date.issued 2023-07-17
dc.identifier.citation Marsonet, Michele. “Philosophical Doubts about reality..” Academicus International Scientific Journal, vol. 28, 2023, pp. 219-223., https://doi.org/10.7336/academicus.2023.28.13. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 2309-1088
dc.identifier.issn 2079-3715
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.epoka.edu.al/handle/1/2295
dc.description.abstract There are many pragmatisms, and it is a little misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce’s and James’ philosophy, while C.I. Lewis’ views on logic were quite different from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display different opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Academicus en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries 28;13
dc.subject metaphilosophy; epistemology; metaphysics; science; realism; en_US
dc.title Philosophical Doubts about reality. en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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